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U.S. national security strategy sets nuclear nonproliferation as a high priority.
However, pursuing nonproliferation without regard for important traditional security
relationships might yield undesired results. The Republic of Korea (ROK) requires a
high degree of confidence in the U.S. security guarantee, one that includes an extended
nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons program that South Korea began and abandoned
in the 1970s was prompted by a decrease in confidence in U.S. security commitments.
Conciliatory actions taken recently by the United States toward the Democratic Peoples'
Republic of Korea (DPRK) to prevent a possible nuclear weapons program may
undermine the U.S.-ROK security arrangement that has been in place for decades. This
work examines perceived threats to South Korea and the U.S. security commitment to
Korea since 1945 to reveal how U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy affects Seoul's
propensity to develop nuclear weapons. Recommendations are provided for policy
makers regarding strengthening of ROK confidence in the U.S. security commitment on
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Nuclear nonproliferation and a stable Korean peninsula are strategic imperatives
for the United States. The U.S.-ROK security relationship dates back to the end of the
Second World War. Seoul requires a high degree of confidence in this security
relationship, one that includes an extended nuclear deterrent guarantee. ROK confidence
in the U.S. security guarantee decreases the likelihood that Seoul will pursue a nuclear
weapons program. A loss of this same confidence could result in South Korea
developing a nuclear capability of its own to compensate for a perceived absence of U.S.
support. Evidence indicates that the nuclear weapons program that ROK began in the
1970s was the result of a decrease in confidence in U.S. security commitments in Asia.
Today, the way the United States deals with the North Korean nuclear crisis could
threaten South Korean national security.
During the 1950s the Korean government saw the utility of nuclear weapons, both
in the atomic diplomacy conducted by the United States during the Korean War and in the
deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. The Korean War and the
U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty established ROK reliance on the United States. The
weak nature of the treaty, however, cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to ROK. The
U.S. troop presence and deployment of nuclear weapons compensated for this weakness.
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, doubts regarding the U.S. commitment in
Asia resurfaced. America's performance in Vietnam, the new Nixon Doctrine, and U.S.
troop withdrawals from ROK spurred Seoul to pursue a more self-reliant military policy.
IX
Although the Nixon Doctrine preserved U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for ROK, this
commitment was ultimately based on the Mutual Defense Treaty; a weak foundation for
confidence in strategic defense. Seoul's attempt to build nuclear weapons was the result
of this perception.
The possibility of a North Korean nuclear weapon has overshadowed its
conventional threat during the 1990s. Exclusive negotiations between the United States
and North Korea are viewed by South Korea as endangering the U.S. commitment to the
defense of South Korea, particularly concessions such as the cancellation of military
exercises and a negative security guarantee. In addition, the Mutual Defense Treaty is not
an agreement that U.S. troop presence strengthens, it is a weak link that these same forces
attempt to overcome. These factors make a stronger treaty with the ROK government an
important step in preventing Seoul from considering a nuclear option. For very little
effort diplomatically, the United States can create a highly stable security environment in
South Korea. A treaty more in line with a NATO commitment would give ROK the
independence it seeks as a developing state and the ironclad commitment it desires for
national security contingencies.
While the U.S. strategic nuclear commitment has existed since the Korean War,
ROK confidence in extended deterrence is measured by the U.S. conventional presence.
While the Nixon Doctrine still guaranteed U.S. strategic commitment to ROK, that same
nuclear commitment lost credibility due to the decrease in conventional commitment that
was outlined by the same policy. ROK leaders believed that if they were to fend for
themselves in terms of defense, this would include nuclear weapons. Lack of
conventional commitment called into question the nuclear guarantee. The deployment of
American tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula inspired a special kind of confidence
in the United States. Without tactical nuclear weapons, the continuation of troop
presence will be vital to maintaining the high level of confidence that is required to
prevent nuclear steps from being taken by Seoul.
The United States should avoid becoming the spokesman for the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations (UN) in issues of
nonproliferation. In Korea, it opened the playing field to a very creative DPRK to bring
up virtually any unrelated issue it wished. An international lead taken by the United
Nations and the IAEA would decrease the likelihood that North Korea could use
unrelated issues to avoid or delay compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
The focus should be on NPT obligations and the required IAEA inspections.
The data in this work reveal a ROK civilian nuclear power program capable of
supporting the development of a virtual nuclear capability. Seoul could pursue this
option in a semi-covert manner, so as not to upset the United States with a withdrawal
from the NPT. Nuclear weapons provide strong deterrence and the opportunity for
internal balancing. U.S. policy should ensure that nonproliferation negotiations with the
DPRK are not threatening to Seoul's national security. From the ROK perspective,
nuclear weapons may be a possible answer to an ambiguous U.S. security commitment.
XI
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I. NONPROLIFERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
A. SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
This thesis examines the conditions under which South Korea would develop
nuclear weapons. U.S. national security strategy sets nuclear nonproliferation as a
priority. In a March 1995 address, President Clinton declared that, "nothing is more
important in this critical year of decision for arms control and nonproliferation than to
achieve the indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions." 1 Pursuing
nonproliferation without regard for important traditional security relationships may yield
undesired results. Richard K. Betts makes this point in even blunter terms: "the reason
that nuclear spread is undesirable is that it threatens our security; nonproliferation policy,
therefore, has to be a subordinate component of national security policy."2 Yet, recent
policies might put nonproliferation ahead of U.S. regional security agreements.
B. COMPETING THEORIES AND LIMITATIONS
Although this work focuses on the security of a state as the motivator for
development of a nuclear weapons program, there are well-respected alternate views
' Factsheet, "A declaration by the President on Security Assurances for Non-nuclear Weapon States Parties
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1996) Available online at [http://www.acda.gov].
2 Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation," Foreign Policy 26 (Spring 1977):
162.
about why states attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Some of these include
technological determinism, national prestige, and the mythmaker model. 3
Technological determinism suggests that technological progress creates a certain
momentum of its own. Nuclear weapons development occurs in a state simply because it
is possible. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has made huge strides in technology,
including civilian nuclear power and weapons technology that includes delivery vehicles.
However, the United States did persuade ROK to abandon its program during the 1970s.
National prestige arguments assume that states acquire nuclear weapons to gain
status in the international community. They are symbols of arrival into the club of heavy
hitters. Examples of ROK seeking prestige include the 1988 Olympic Games and gaining
membership in the United Nations. But acquiring nuclear weapons can lead to a state
achieving pariah status, rather than serving as a sign that a country is on the fast track to
modernization. The U.S. reaction to the development of nuclear weapons in ROK would
also be negative.
Peter Lavoy's mythmaker model asserts that a state will go nuclear when
"proficient and well-positioned individuals who want their county to build nuclear'
bombs, exaggerate security threats to make a 'myth of nuclear security' more
compelling."4 There is little doubt that South Korean President Pak Chung-Hee was a
3 Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4
(Spring/Summer 1993): 192-212; and Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three
Models in Search of a Bomb," Security Studies 21, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 58.
4 Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," 192.
major force behind the nuclear program in the 1970s. In this case, however, ROK was a
nation used to having nuclear weapons guarantee their security. The credibility of the
provider of this security, the United States, was in doubt. External threats, specifically
that of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), were probably greatly
exaggerated for this express purpose. Exaggeration of the threat for political purposes is
not unknown in ROK.
Aspects of each of these theories might be valid in the ROK case, but realism is
the most applicable theory in explaining South Korean behavior. According to Joseph A.
Yager, "In some counties, the acquisition of nuclear weapons may be thought to enhance
national prestige or increase the influence of the technological or military elite. There is
no evidence that these considerations play any significant role in South Korean thinking.
The case for ROK acquiring nuclear weapons rests entirely on national security."5 Since
1948, South Korea has faced a constant and significant threat from the DPRK. The
overwhelming reasons for the development of a nuclear arsenal would focus on this
threat, and on a decrease in the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee. Since the late
1950s, the United States has provided a nuclear guarantee for ROK, a vital tile of
deterrence in the mosaic ofROK national security.
5 Joseph A. Yager, "Northeast Asia", in Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Richard Betts,
William H. Courtney, Henry S. Rowen, Richard Brody and Joseph Yager. (Washington D. C: The
Brookings Institution, 1980), 50-1.
C. USING A REALIST LENS ON THE PENINSULA
The dual nature of U.S.-ROK security relations has created an environment ripe
for the development of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Second World War, Seoul
has depended on U.S. military support and security guarantees. Although ROK has
sometimes questioned this guarantee, the security relationship with the United States
continues. A loss in confidence, according to realist theory, would cause Seoul to pursue
a more reliable internal balance rather than continue to trust the external balance
influenced by changing U.S. policy.6 This internal balance consists of a self-sufficient
military capability controlled domestically with a higher degree of confidence than an
external balance based on potentially unreliable alliances. U.S. troop presence and
nuclear guarantees have usually overcome ROK doubts regarding the Mutual Security
Treaty. A ROK attempt at self-sufficiency would include a nuclear force since South
Korea has relied on U.S. atomic weapons since the Korean War.
Realism predicts that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one state will lead
another state in the region to respond in kind. 7 This prediction would seem to hold when
the two countries are hostile, as is the case with the two Koreas. Seo-Hang Lee points to
the possible negative results of North Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon:
In May 1994, National Unification Minister and Deputy Prime Minister,
Lee Hong-Koo, stated that if North Korea developed "even half of a
nuclear weapon," the 1991 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula would be nullified. There is also growing sentiment
" Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 168.
' Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," 57-8.
among some scientists and politicians for South Korea to cease abiding by
the Joint Declaration that prohibited nuclear reprocessing. Reprocessing is
not, of course, banned by the NPT. 8
Ambiguity still exists concerning the existence of a bomb in the North Korea. This
makes analysis of Seoul's perspective on U.S. actions and policies all the more important.
D. METHODOLOGY
This work examines milestone events since 1945 described by the following two
variables: (1) perceived threats to South Korea; (2) the U.S. security commitment to
Korea. I break this period into three phases. The first is 1945 to 1965. Here I explore the
U.S. role in the liberation of Korea and the subsequent split of the peninsula, the Korean
War and the diplomatic use and deployment of nuclear weapons in the 1950s. The
second is 1965 to 1985. Here I focus on the Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine, U.S.
troop withdrawals and the squelched ROK nuclear weapons program. The third is 1985
to the present. In this section, I analyze the post-Cold War security environment and the
nuclear crisis in the DPRK. A study of these events will reveal the U.S. role in ROK
national security, ROK confidence in that role, and how U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
policy affects the ROK propensity to develop nuclear weapons. An examination of the
essential events that affected the South Korean leadership's perception of external threats
and U.S. security commitment to South Korea allows for analysis of Seoul's current and
future perspective on required national defense capabilities. This thesis assesses the
° Seo-Hang Lee, "Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: South Korean Perspective," in Nuclear Policies
in Northeast Asia, ed. Andrew Mack (New York: United Nations, 1995), 193.
sources and catalysts of South Korea's nuclear ambitions today as they are influenced by
U.S. commitments to both nuclear nonproliferation toward North Korea and regional
security in Northeast Asia.
E. THE ROK PROGRAM AND THE NORTH KOREAN CRISIS
Andrew Mack emphasizes the fine line between ensuring that North Korea does
not develop the bomb and keeping ROK confidence in the U.S. security guarantee high:
"South Korea, which is rapidly overhauling the North militarily and economically, and
which is also 'protected' by the US 'nuclear umbrella', has a clear interest in a
denuclearised Korean peninsula, providing the North does not go nuclear and providing
Seoul retains confidence in its alliance relationship with the US."9 The nuclear weapons
program that ROK began in the 1970s was the result of a decrease in confidence in U.S.
security commitments. Actions taken by the United States prevented ROK from
continuing the development of nuclear weapons. Crucial among these actions were the
cancellation of the planned troop withdrawal from Korea by the Carter administration in
the late 1970s and the promise of continued support for the ROK civilian nuclear power
program. Today, South Korea has a robust nuclear power program and the U.S. troop
presence continues.
The manner in which the United States dealt with the recent North Korean nuclear
crisis could again call into question U.S. credibility. Today, however, the possible
3>
" Andrew Mack, "A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone: Problems and Prospects," in Nuclear Policies in
Northeast Asia, ed. Andrew Mack (New York: United Nations, 1995), 106.
presence of a North Korean nuclear arsenal and a waning U.S. influence in Korea change
the dynamics of the situation. The United States does not possess the same authority over
Seoul that it did in the 1970s.
F. RELEVANCE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Nuclear weapons nonproliferation and a stable, nuclear-free Korean peninsula are
high priorities in the United States National Security Strategy. In outlining the top
priorities for U. S. national security, National Security Strategy states that, "we must
continue to move strongly to counter growing dangers to our security: weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism, international crime... acting to prevent nuclear materials from
falling into the wrong hands...". 10 A State Department paper on nuclear nonproliferation
states, "the United States is strongly committed to the NPT, to efforts that further
strengthen the Treaty, and to the broader international nonproliferation and arms control
regime." 11 In April 1996, President Clinton also reaffirmed Washington's commitment
to systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. 12
Although the specter of a bipolar nuclear exchange between the United States and
Russia is waning, the prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation in developing states is of
™ White House, "A National Security Strategy For A New Century," (Washington D.C.: National Security
Council, 1997) Available online at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
1 1 State Department Fact Sheet, "U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1997).
*2 Fact Sheet, "U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"
great concern. Many of these states possess both civilian nuclear power programs and
delivery vehicle technology. Adherence to elements of the nonproliferation regime is an
important element in preventing advancing nations from using nuclear power technology
to develop atomic weapons programs. Japan's latent nuclear capability and plutonium
stockpile, North Korea's still ambiguous nuclear program and the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Israel, Pakistan and India (all non-signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty)
call into question the utility of the NPT. 13 The May 1998 underground Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests are further proof that countries consider nuclear weapons of great
enough importance to national security to risk international economic sanctions.
Exploring the motivations to acquire nuclear capabilities while forging new
nonproliferation strategies is a complex, yet important step in countering these dangers.
U.S. nonproliferation policy must enhance, not contradict, U.S. regional security
guarantees.
G. ROADMAP
Chapter II covers events from the Second World War to the mid 1960s. Chapter
IQ discusses the rise and fall of the South Korean nuclear weapons program in the 1970s,
including the events that led South Korea to undertake the program and the actions that
were taken by the United States to short circuit ROK acquisition of nuclear weapons.
13 For background on the nuclear ambitions of these states, see, Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the
Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Reiss, Bridled Ambition:
Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities; and Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds.,
Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994).
Chapter IV analyzes events in the 1980s and the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1995,
examining the gap between U.S. nonproliferation policy toward North Korea and the
security guarantees still in place with regard to South Korea. Chapter V draws
conclusions using the evidence described in the previous chapters to explain what factors
influence ROK to consider a nuclear option and assesses Seoul's current nuclear
technology. Finally, I will outline recommendations for policy makers regarding the
dilemma between U.S. regional security policy and non-proliferation diplomacy,
providing steps to strengthen both ROK confidence in U.S. security commitments on the
peninsula while still achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals.
10
II. ORIGINS OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
An assessment of the likelihood that ROK would pursue a nuclear weapons
program requires an examination of the U.S.-ROK security relationship. This chapter
identifies ROK security milestones from 1945 to 1965. It outlines the origins of the
U.S.-ROK security relationship and subsequent events that affected U.S. commitment to
the peninsula. During this period, the United States moved from a policy of minimum
commitment in Korea, to regarding the Korean peninsula as a vital front in the U.S.
struggle against the spread of communism. This was a battle of utmost importance in
U.S. national security. Arthur Power Dudden writes of the Cold War significance of the
Korean peninsula: "In part at least, owing to its unresolved outcome, the Korean War
redefined international relations as a gigantic struggle ongoing between Communist
societies and beleaguered defenders of the so-called free-world." 14 Key events in this
period include the use of nuclear threats against the Peoples' Republic of China by the
United States during the Korean War, the signing and implementation of the U.S.-ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, and the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to
the Korean peninsula beginning in the late 1950s.
While the United States viewed its policy toward Korea within a global, Cold War
context, ROK officials regarded the U.S. security guarantee as a vital aegis against the
' 4 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 232.
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threat in North Korea. This commitment included not only an American troop presence,
but a nuclear deterrent as well, although the currents of the Cold War directed U.S.
policy. From Seoul's perspective, the U.S. security commitment was vital to ROK
national security, but was regarded with some skepticism. According to Ronald D.
McLaurin, "For Korea, all other matters around the world must be interpreted in terms of
their impact on the Korean Peninsula. The United States can accept a setback in Korea,
however undesirable. This is an existential issue for Korea." 15 U.S. forces provided
security against the threat to the north. The use of nuclear weapons to guarantee ROK
national security began early in the atomic age. The result was that Korea relied almost
completely on the United States for its national security requirements, while remaining
skeptical of U.S. credibility. In the past, U.S. support waxed and waned. The U.S.
withdrawal prior to the Korean War and the less than ironclad U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty weakened confidence in the United States. The Korean War and the deployment
of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were, in contrast, confidence builders. From Seoul's
view, the future of the U.S. security commitment to the Korean peninsula was far from
guaranteed. Later U.S. actions reinforced this perception.
B. U.S. POLICY OF MINIMUM COMMITMENT
The roots of the U.S.-ROK security relationship date back to the Soviet-American
liberation of the Korean peninsula in 1945. Underlying Korean doubts regarding the U.S.
*5 Ronald D. McLaurin, "Security Relations: Burden -Sharing In A Changing Strategic Environment," in
Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution ofSouth Korean-U.S. Relations, eds. Ronald D. McLaurin,
Manwoo Lee and Chung-in Moon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 229.
12
commitment to Korea, however, actually originate with the U.S. recognition of Japan's
annexation of Korea earlier in the century. The Taft-Katsura memorandum of 29 July
1905 and the subsequent recall of Edwin Morgan, the American minister to Korea, in
November 1905, confirmed U.S. acquiescence to Japan's aggression toward Korea. 16
While the details of these policies are beyond the scope of this work, the results are not.
U.S. policy after the Second World War lacked an appreciation for Korean national
interest and history, and called into question U.S. credibility as a liberator and guarantor
of security. Two U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel,
using a National Geographic map for reference, split the U.S. and Soviet zones at the 38th
parallel. Had a Korea expert been present, they might have learned that this was the same
line that Japan and Russia had contemplated after the Russo-Japanese War: the 38
parallel already smacked of major powers dividing Korea as the spoils of war. 17
In 1945, the United States began administering its portion of the Korean
peninsula. America's lack of expertise and the low priority of the Korean problem were
again conspicuous. A U.S. military government, headed by General John R. Hodge,
USA, was set up to administer Korea south of the 38 th parallel. In the absence of
guidance from Washington, General Hodge governed in an ad hoc fashion, leading to dire
economic conditions in the south. The administration also continued to employ Japanese
*" Dae-Sook Suh, "The Centennial: A Brief History," in Korea and the United States, eds. Youngnok Koo
and Dae-Sook Suh (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 7.
17 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley,
1997), 6.
13
personnel from the defeated colonial government in managerial positions. 18 General
Hodge was unaware of the Korean hatred of the Japanese following their despotic
colonial rule of the peninsula. 19 Not only was Hodge not aware of the Korean bitterness
toward their former colonial masters, but he was directed by Washington not to recognize
any of the Korean political fronts that had formed during and after the war. This included
the provisional government that had been in exile in China and that most Koreans
respected.20 Hodge's orders removed from the running the best organizations to form a
new government in Korea. This stood in sharp contrast with the Soviet administered
north, which rapidly established a centralized regime around former guerrilla fighter Kim
D-Sung and cleansed itself of any Japanese colonial remnants.21
A joint commission was set up between the Soviet forces in the north and the U.S.
forces in the south. This arrangement was to be temporary: the original trusteeship was
set for five years. Its mission was to ensure that a stable Korean government was
established. The commission was a failure. Suspicions ran too high between the
emerging superpowers to oversee elections and set up a new Korean government. By
1947, the U.S. War Department supported complete disengagement and troop withdrawal'
from Korea. The State Department, contemplating the impending Cold War with the
*° Joo-Hong Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 18.
19 Suk-Bok Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea (Washington D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1987), 10.
20 Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea, 10.
14
Soviet Union, realized that such action would turn the entire Korean peninsula over to a
communist-backed regime. This disagreement ultimately led the United States to defer
the problem of Korea to the newly formed United Nations, hoping that this would prevent
Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula. This policy of minimum commitment was
followed by a withdrawal of most of the U.S. military personnel from the area. In 1947, a
UN commission was established and held elections, which the government in the north
refused to recognize. Thus, the Republic of Korea was born on 15 August 1947. The
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea came into existence in September of the same
year. 22
Even as the peninsula split, Washington was searching for a way to depart from
the peninsula, while still ensuring that Korea gained its sovereignty according to the Yalta
and Cairo agreements.23 In September of 1947, American policy stated that, "every effort
should be made to liquidate or reduce the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea
as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination."24 One result of this
contradictory policy was the inability to create a workable, united government in Korea.
This hollow commitment on the part of the United States contributed to the north-south
split and the Korean War. The unenlightened performance of the U.S. military
21 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 18.
22 Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990), 46-7.
23 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 13.
24 Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea, 20.
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government in Korea and the subsequent withdrawal of most U.S. troops despite a hostile
government in Pyongyang are not likely to be forgotten by South Koreas, in spite of the
later U.S. commitment during the Korean War.
C. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN THE KOREAN WAR
The Korean War also saw the first use of nuclear diplomacy. During the Korean
conflict, President Truman ordered nuclear configured bombers into the theater in 1950
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told India's Jawaharal Neru in 1953 that the
United States would use "stronger rather than lesser" military force if the talks in
Panmunjom ended. 25 Whether this atomic posturing actually brought about the cease-fire
in Korea is still debated.26 The perception at that time was that nuclear threats were the
deciding factor. Nuclear weapons had changed the world of security and diplomacy. The
leaders of both Koreas saw the utility and necessity of including a nuclear element at
some level in their respective national security programs. Security guarantees from the
United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective atomic arsenals provided this
nuclear deterrent. External guarantees are less credible than possessing a defense
capability within one's own state.27 ROK was not capable of standing up its own defense
^^ Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 15-6.
2" Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter
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force and relied on the capabilities of the United States for protection against the menace
to the north. A part of those capabilities was a nuclear arsenal.
Recent literature raises questions regarding the significance given to these nuclear
threats in ending the fighting.28 The perception at the time and for years after, however,
was that atomic arms played a major role in bringing the communists to the negotiating
table. Even critics of nuclear diplomacy concede that the issue is not that nuclear
weapons were not influential, but that they were less so than previously believed.
Richard K. Betts, for example, points out some of the difficulties in evaluating use of
nuclear diplomacy:
...the greatest barrier to judging the efficacy of threats is that there is not
reliable evidence about what leaders in Moscow or Beijing were thinking
during the crisis. Thus there is no way to be sure what their initial
objectives were or how high they placed them, and therefore no way to be
sure how much they really conceded in the outcomes of the
confrontations.29
Nevertheless, it is the perception during the early 1950s that is important in this
study. These events gave legitimacy to Eisenhower's New Look strategy, the concept of
substituting nuclear weapons for conventional ones. 30 Nuclear weapons had been used to
reach an armistice. Jerome H. Kahan notes that, "...to President Eisenhower and a
number of his advisors, the lesson of Korea appeared to confirm at an early stage the
2° Rosemary J. Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," International Security 13,
no. 3 (Winter 1988/9): 92.
29 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1987), 18.
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validity of a defense policy that avoided the need to invest resources in preparing for
conventional land wars by relying on nuclear power."31 Seoul would come to rely on
U.S. weapons guaranteeing the security of South Korea. The New Look strategy had
come into being and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to ROK would tie
Korean defense to nuclear arms for decades to come.
D. U.S.-ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY
The Mutual Defense Treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, a little over two months
after the armistice, was designed to prevent renewed communist aggression on the
Korean peninsula. 32 It also responded to President Singman Rhee's insistence on
receiving American aid and a security commitment. According to Lee Suk Bok, "When
President Rhee voiced strong objections to the armistice, the US government promised, in
addition to the treaty, large-scale economic and military aid, and an increase of twenty
Army divisions and naval air forces in compensation."33 The treaty yielded two very
different results. It inextricably tied the security of ROK to the Cold War. The weak
language of the agreement also reinforced the ever-present doubts in Seoul about
continued U.S. support. The Mutual Defense Treaty manifests the dichotomy of the U.S.-
3" Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 37.
31 Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), 18.
32 Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea: Backgroundfor Policy (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1982), 67.
33 Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea, 57.
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ROK security relationship that still exists today. It is this agreement that eventually led to
the deployment of U.S. troops and tactical nuclear weapons onto the peninsula and the
guarantee of a nuclear umbrella for ROK. The U.S. point of view, however, was that
Korean security was important in the context of the Cold War, not because Korean
interests coincided with those of the United States. As Joo- Hong Nam points out, "The
essential American objective in Korea was nonetheless not the security of South Korea
per se but overall regional stability that might be affected by developments in Korea. In
other words, the U.S. was committed not so much to goals in Korea as to goals threatened
by Korean instability."34
The wording of the treaty itself does not guarantee U.S. protection, even in the
case of attack from North Korea. The essential portions of the treaty are articles two,
three and four:
Article II: The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of
them, the political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by
external armed attack, separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties will
maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable
measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its
purposes.
Article HI: Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either
of the parties' territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter
recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of
the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
34 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 45.
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Article IV: The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America
accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about the
territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement. 35
Article two, with its references to self-help and the development of appropriate
means to deter an armed attack, could be used to support the development of a strong,
modern ROK defense force. These references to deterrence make it clear that the ability
to win an armed conflict against the DPRK is not the goal of the ROK defense force and
the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. The goal is to deter an attack. This is
precisely the type of argument used when discussing the deployment of nuclear weapons
to the Korean peninsula. The wording of article two, the core of the treaty, is ambiguous
about the sort of U.S. commitment it guarantees. Is there a guarantee of automatic
intervention, as with the NATO treaty? According to Nam, the Mutual Defense Treaty is,
"essentially a unilateral guarantee. However, the language of the U.S. defense
commitment to the Republic was written according to the traditional Monroe Doctrine
formula. Under this the U.S. can, if it so chooses, avoid an automatic involvement in any
local conflict in the name of mutually acknowledged constitutional restraints."36 Many
Koreans question when and if the United States would come to Seoul's aid. Lee Suk Bok
points out that, "Koreans believe that the U.S. presence in Korea fulfills the terms of the
treaty, but they question whether the United States has the will to come to Korea's
3^ Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, prepared by the library of
Congress Congressional Research Service, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1995, Committee Print 103, 455.
-*" Nam, America's Commitment to Korea, 146.
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defense."37 This infers that the U.S. troop presence is more important than the treaty
itself because it serves as a tripwire for other commitment, including nuclear assets.38
E. DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS
The U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons to ROK was a natural extension of the
Eisenhower New Look strategy and the U.S. defense commitment, however ambiguous,
offered by the Mutual Defense Treaty. Article two of that document states as a goal the
deterrence of armed attack. The New Look emphasized reliance upon U.S. superiority in
nuclear weapons, not conventional forces.39 Although applying this policy to regional
commitments risked nuclear escalation, the Cold War ranked high enough in U.S.
national interest to justify that risk on the Korean peninsula. There is also evidence that
the deployment of these weapons was not considered extraordinary. Kahan points out
that early in Eisenhower's second term he concluded that tactical nuclear weapons had
become "an almost routine part of our equipment" and acknowledged that the United
States would almost be required to use these systems in an Asian crisis "the way our
3
' Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea, 58.
3 ° Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, D.C.: Cato
Institute, 1996).
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21
forces are organized in that area."40 Deployment of tactical nuclear weapons occurred in
1957-58 in the form of Honest John rockets and 280mm artillery rounds.41
It was not until almost 20 years later that the United States acknowledged the
presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. It was also at this time that
the United States made public the strategy to use nuclear weapons against North Korea
during a conflict. In fact, plans to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Korea had been
in place since their deployment in 1957-8.42
F. CONCLUSION
The events chronicled in this chapter illustrate two important points. One, the
varying nature of U.S. commitment to Korea did not begin with the Nixon Doctrine
(discussed in Chapter IU), but has been evident since early in this century. Although
Seoul has depended almost completely on the United States for national security since the
Korean War, that reliance is also a weakness. The Korean people doubt the U.S.
commitment to their defense. U.S. support of Japan's annexation of Korea early in this
century was a glimpse at what was to come. The lack of American commitment to the
liberation and post-war administration of Korea played a significant part in bringing about
the split of the north and south and the Korean War. The Mutual Defense Treaty is both
4^ Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, 17.
41 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 87; also Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 257'.
42 Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces, Studies in Defense Policy
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), 5.
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necessary for ROK security and at the same time is far from an ironclad commitment.
Some events have called into question the U.S. commitment to Korean defense despite
ROK reliance on the U.S. for much of its defense since the Second World War. The U.S.
acquiescence to Japan's colonization of Korea and U.S. actions between the Second
World War and the Korean War reinforced this doubt.
Almost since the creation of the Republic of Korea, nuclear weapons have been
integral to ROK national security. Although ROK nuclear aspirations did not surface
until much later, events during this period displayed to Seoul the power, diplomatic utility
and necessity of nuclear weapons to the national security strategy of South Korea. The
threatened use of nuclear weapons to end the Korean War and the subsequent deployment




III. VIETNAM, NIXON, AND THE CARTER YEARS
A. IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM ERA
U.S. policies during the 1960s and 1970s decreased Seoul's confidence in the U.S.
commitment to Korean defense to the point that ROK began a nuclear weapons program.
An analysis of the U.S.-ROK relationship during the 1960s and 1970s is critical to this
thesis because this situation could again arise and cause Seoul to consider a nuclear
option for similar reasons. The war in Vietnam should have reinforced confidence in the
American commitment in Asia. In reality it did just the opposite. The American record
in Southeast Asia and the fall of Saigon resulted in faltering confidence in the U.S.
security commitment throughout Asia. No longer could Seoul assume that the global
struggle against communism would anchor Korea to the U.S. National Security Strategy.
Walter F. Hahn states that the outcome of American involvement in Vietnam
"represented the collapse of a U.S. commitment and endeavor that spanned the better part
of two decades."43 Events from 1965 to 1975 confirmed a waning U.S. resolve. This
chapter identifies three results of the Vietnam War: a realization that a security
relationship with the U.S. obligated Seoul to send troops overseas; a loss of confidence in
U.S. guarantees in Asia; and the expectation of American troop withdrawals in Asia. The
North Korean seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship, USS Pueblo, and the resulting incident
4^ Walter F. Hahn, "American Introversion Post-Vietnam." Strategic Review 3, no. 4 (Fall 1975): 18-9.
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is also discussed. This event decreased confidence in Washington's commitment to Asia
and foreshadowed the coming Nixon Doctrine.
South Korea deployed troops to Vietnam in 1965. This occurred at the behest of
the United States. To emphasize the global nature of the conflict in Vietnam against the
expansion of communism, the United States formed a multinational force. It put the fight
against communism in Southeast Asia in the same category as its commitment to South
Korea. Although the European states balked at this plea, Asian allies, including the
Philippines, Japan and South Korea, contributed to the effort. In an agreement for
continued U.S. presence and military equipment, Seoul sent two ROK Army divisions
into combat in Vietnam.44 ROK reliance on the United States involved Seoul in an
unwanted commitment in Vietnam. Ironically, since President Park wanted to decrease
ROK dependence on the United States, the troops were sent with the agreement that the
United States would help Seoul modernize the ROK military. Washington provided a
significant package of economic and military payments listed in the Brown Memorandum
of 1966.45 The commitment of South Korean troops in Vietnam as a quid pro quo for
high tech weapons was part of a larger plan for a South Korean military capable of
fending for itself.46 The Vietnam War was actually an economic boon to ROK.
Procurement and construction contracts accounted for up to forty percent of South
44 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 58.
45 Carter J. Eckert et al, ed. Korea, Old and New: A History (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 398.
46 Eckert et al, Korea, Old and New: A History, 398.
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Korea's foreign exchange earnings.47 Nevertheless, the ROK government also realized
that dependence on the United States obligated ROK to send troops to Vietnam that
would otherwise have guarded the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This was a part of the
security agreement that Seoul had not anticipated.
The sudden collapse of South Vietnam which had been supported by the United
States for over twenty years, caused U.S. allies in Asia to have doubts about the reliability
of the United States if they should face a military threat. The American withdrawal had a
strong affect on South Korea's view of the U.S. commitment.48 Although American
policy makers called Vietnam a war of global consequences, and one that required
support from other Asian nations, U.S. commitment flagged as the American public
questioned involvement in Southeast Asia. When calling for support, Washington
originally compared the situation in Southeast Asia with that of Korea.49 Given the U.S.
withdrawal from South Vietnam, the earlier comparison with its security agreement with
South Korea did not inspire confidence in Seoul. The fall of Saigon did not result in U.S.
allies questioning U.S. capability, but U.S. resolve in Asia. Hahn observes that,
"perceptions abroad have seen the fall of Vietnam not so much as an American defeat as
an American abandonment."50 The belief that other nations should share in the burden of
4
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leadership and defense resulted not only in the withdrawal from Vietnam but in the Nixon
Doctrine. These policies became the focus of a new approach toward defense and self-
reliance for Seoul.
ROK confidence in U.S. support was waning after the fall of Saigon. Ambassador
Richard Sneider recommended that the United States restructure its policies toward Korea
and strengthen its commitment. Washington declined this suggestion in favor of
recommending disengagement from Korea and Asia, particularly in light of the recent and
still painful memory of the Vietnam experience. 51 Interestingly, Sneider, realizing the
weakness of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, recommended a plan he called "durable
partnership," which outlined a strong security agreement similar to those of NATO and
Japan.52 From Washington's point of view, however, security commitments were
changing and the United States soon began to discuss withdrawing forces from the
Korean peninsula. Washington's new policy on overseas security commitments helped
Seoul justify its new program of self-reliance in the 1970s.
The capture of the crew of the U.S. intelligence ship USS Pueblo, in January
1968, represented the culmination of the many problems with U.S. credibility during this
era. As the DPRK captured, tortured and held hostage American sailors, ROK and the
world waited for the United States to respond to this crisis. Kissinger stated that in
demanding nothing, the United States had lost the opportunity to either accept
51 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 65-6.
52 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 65-6.
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compensation or justify retaliation, depending upon Pyongyang's response.53 The
perception was that the United States had taken an unorganized, ad hoc approach, fearing
reactions from the unpredictable DPRK, which eventually returned the captured men.54
Nam asserts that this translated into reduced U.S. credibility from the ROK point of
view.55 This event also called into question the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Northeast
Asia, which did not prevent the incident.
The Pueblo incident severely damaged the credibility of the deterrent effect of the
U.S. conventional forces in the area. Again, Nam describes Seoul's view of the results:
"From South Korea's perspective, therefore, America's inaction might mean that in
extreme cases when deterrence was most strongly needed, the practicality of the U.S.
commitment would not longer be certain."56 During his first interview after the fall of
Saigon, ROK President Park declared that, "There were and still are many Koreans
doubting the commitment of the United States."57 The Nixon Doctrine asserted that the
United States was guaranteeing its security commitments in Asia with a nuclear umbrella,
leaving each country responsible for its own national security at lower levels of conflict.
With loss of confidence in conventional support, however, America's strategic credibility
" Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 84.
54 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 85.
55 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 85.
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also decreased in Seoul's view. No longer confident that U.S. foreign policy coincided
with South Korean national security concerns, South Korea began to look for alternatives
to a dwindling U.S. commitment. These were outlined in the first five year military
modernization plan, and included the strengthening of the military-industrial
infrastructure, the purchase and development of advanced conventional weapons, and the
development of nuclear weapons.
B. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE TROOP WITHDRAWALS
In July 1968, while visiting the island of Guam, President Richard M. Nixon gave
a speech outlining a new policy regarding military commitments to Asian allies. Initially
referred to as the Guam Doctrine, it later became know as the Nixon Doctrine. This
policy called for U.S. allies in Asia to take primary responsibility for their own defense.
The speech promised Asian nations that America would guarantee its security
commitments in the region with a nuclear umbrella, not with conventional forces.
Discussions began regarding a plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Asia, but these troops
gave the nuclear security commitment credibility.58 The withdrawal of the U.S. Seventh
Division in 1971 left the Second Division, as the only U.S. unit deployed along the
Demilitarized Zone. In America, however, there was a growing call for disengagement
overseas. The Nixon Doctrine called for allies to develop a self-sufficient military.
Threats beyond their capability would be dispatched by U.S. naval, air and nuclear forces.
In fact, U.S. doctrine called for the use of atomic weapons against a non-nuclear state
5 ° Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 85.
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(North Korea) in the case of an attack, due to the overwhelming conventional superiority
that North Korea possessed at that time against the U.S. and South Korean forces on the
peninsula.59 The U.S. performance in Vietnam and the Pueblo incident, however, called
into question the reliability of all U.S. commitments, including the nuclear guarantee.
President Park regarded the Nixon Doctrine as an opportunity to create a more
secure, self-sufficient future for ROK. Seoul immediately planned to compensate for the
loss of U.S. forces by developing a robust, self-reliant military. This plan even entailed
developing nuclear capabilities.60 From the South Korean perspective, development of
nuclear weapons was a crucial part of national security. Seoul required more than
military parity. It demanded a capability devastating enough to achieve deterrence. In
fact, Young Whan Kihl makes the observations that, "Seoul would argue that the
acquisition of a nuclear capability by the South is intended not so much for use against
the population of North Korea as to deter North Korean threats and aggression."61 The
planned U.S. troop withdrawal increased ROK desire to develop a self-sufficient defense
program.
The Nixon Doctrine attempted to resolve the different agendas of the United
States and South Korea, but in essence gave Seoul a green light to develop a strong
military. This step-down in U.S. commitment, however, was a wake up call to the
-*" Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 88.
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leadership in South Korea. From Seoul's perspective, it was another indication of waning
U.S. protection. A program aimed at a more self-sufficient defense capability was a wise
policy. For President Park, this meant the development of a military capable of more than
merely repelling a North Korean attack. Given the unpredictability of the North Korean
leadership, South Korean forces had to deter the North from any attempt at attack.62 This
meant the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal.
The status quo provided by the Cold War threats changed drastically in the 1960s
and 1970s for several reasons. The American experience in Vietnam led many Asian
allies to question the credibility of the U.S. commitment in Asia. During this period, the
United States began working on detente with the communist powers of the world. South
Korea, however, still saw communism as an unchanged threat. Washington's pursuit of
relations with the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union was disconcerting to
ROK, which still faced a highly aggressive communist North Korea.63 The combination
of the U.S.-Sino detente and the Sino-Soviet split led many to question the requirement
for U.S. troop deployments on the Asian continent in support of Cold War threats. Many
regarded the moral obligation the United States had toward South Korea and its security
arrangement against North Korea as outmoded. Certainly, it was questionable whether it
still paralleled U.S. national interests, as Joo-Hong Nam points out: "The problem of the
American commitment to South Korea during the seventies was rooted in the sense of
"2 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 89.
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asymmetry between the American conception of national interest at stake in Korea and
the costs it estimated to be necessary in honouring the commitment in the event of
war."64 Korea's prime position within U.S. foreign policy was changing for the worse,
and Korean leaders needed a defense capability to stand in the gap that this change
created.
C. THE CARTER PLAN AND KOREAGATE
During his presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter talked of withdrawing all
American ground troops from the Korean peninsula. After he was elected, he began to
discuss how to best put this promise into action. The administration discussed a program
to remove all American forces, except some Air Force personnel, over a period of six
years. The Carter withdrawal plan was proof to Seoul that Korea was losing its strategic
significance to the United States. Sungjoo Han states that:
President Carter's decision to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea
by 1982 confirmed what the South Korean government had already
suspected for some time: that the Korean peninsula was gradually losing
its military importance in the American global strategic thinking; and that
Seoul's near-blind faith in the United States as a guarantor of its security
should be radically reappraised.65
The United States had been the mainstay of South Korean defense against
Pyongyang since the Korean War. Deterrence, rather than the ability to defend the
"4 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 5.
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peninsula was the top priority for Seoul.66 Could they accomplish this without American
forces?
President Carter's plan met with criticism from all sides. Those who agreed with
the Carter Plan argued that maintaining troops in Korea would ensure automatic U.S.
involvement in a land war in Asia when South Korea no longer possessed sufficient
strategic value for the U.S. ground troops there to serve as a tripwire. Supporters also
believed that both the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China would restrain
North Korea from invading, and that the strong South Korean economy could provide for
its own national defense. In an armed conflict, the United States would be able to support
South Korea using naval and air forces, without having to maintain ground troops on the
peninsula. Last, those in Carter's camp believed that the continuing political repression
and socioeconomic injustice made South Korea unworthy of defense by American
troops.67
Those who disagreed with the plan argued that since there was a serious military
imbalance between North and South Korea, a premature withdrawal of the U.S. troops
would tempt the aggressive and unpredictable regime in Pyongyang to attack the South,
and could at the very least, lead the two Koreas into an expensive and dangerous arms
race which might include the development of nuclear capabilities. The ax murder of two
American officers on 18 August 1976 by North Korean guards while clearing vegetation
°" Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea, 54.
"' Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance," 47.
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in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom is a clear example of the unpredictability
of the regime in the North. Similarly erratic actions periodically reaffirm this
observation.68 This fact further reinforced the need for a credible deterrence force
provided by the United States. If this were not provided it would have to be replaced by
an indigenous one, even if that meant the development of a nuclear arsenal.
It was also believed that U.S. disengagement in Korea could create Japanese
doubts about the credibility of U.S. security commitments to their own county, possibly
leading them to pursue rearmament or accommodation with the Soviet Union. Critics
believed that the Carter plan would deprive the United States and ROK of the opportunity
to bargain with the communists for the stabilization of the Korean situation, and would
have a serious negative effect on South Korea's continued economic growth and political
liberalization. Last, the plan would result in the transfer of operational command of the
ROK armed forces to South Korea, making it more difficult to control the military
situation on the Korean peninsula.69
Many in the U.S. military, Congress, and the government in Seoul disagreed with
the plan to remove ground forces from the Korean peninsula. Major General John K.
Singlaub, the Chief of Staff of the American forces in Korea publicly criticized Carter's
plan to withdraw forces, saying that it amounted to an, "invitation to the world to expect
"° Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea, 91 . Other examples include the assassination
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"" Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance," 47.
35
an inevitable war."70 President Carter recalled him to Washington and reassigned him.
This event fanned the flames of critics in Congress and elsewhere.71 Carter planned to
reaffirm U.S. naval and air support and the nuclear umbrella and provide a $1.8 billion
package in military equipment.72 The Carter administration was convinced that South
Korea could defend itself, especially given its rapid economic growth, which would
enable it to fund a technically advanced military. Seoul interpreted the planned removal
of the U.S. troops and tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea as weakened
commitment and deterrence. Young Whan Kihl elaborates, "South Korea will feel
insecure if the Carter policy of removing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Korea is
realized. Seoul naturally hopes-but is not likely-to inherit some of the nuclear weapons
equipment and warheads from the U.S. forces in Korea."73 Although the transfer of U.S.
nuclear weapons would have been unlikely, the House Appropriations Committee
recommended the transfer of Hawk, Nike-Hercules and nuclear capable Sergeant and
Honest John missiles to the South Korean military.74 South Korean President Park
Chung-Hee was heard suggesting that ROK might push for the development of its own
nuclear weapons if the United States removed its tactical nuclear weapons and troops
'Q Edward Walsh and George C. Wilson, "President Defends His Korea Policy: Push to Develop Nuclear
Weapons Hinted In Seoul." The Washington Post, 27 May 1977, A-l.
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from South Korea. Park's aid was quoted as saying, "As a matter of principle we should
have the freedom to take necessary actions within our ability to ensure our survival. As
to the question of nuclear weapons development, we would consider the matter on that
basis."75
Dissent from Congress and the Department of Defense ultimately halted Carter's
plan. The consensus was that the U.S. presence did play an irreplaceable role in deterring
North Korea, and maintaining a precarious balance that involved all nations in Northeast
Asia. According to Chang -yoon Choi:
U.S. forces have been an excellent bargaining chip with which the U.S.
could coax the North Korean leadership into an accommodation with the
South. In that sense, President Carter would have thrown away the biggest
bargaining advantage for bringing about a political settlement in
Korea... eventually the South might be forced to develop a nuclear
weapons capability. That, in turn, would almost certainly trigger similar
efforts on the part of North Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.76
U.S. ground forces in Korea prevented a possible nuclear domino effect in East Asia.
The Park Tong-sun Affair, exposed in 1977, and later renamed Koreagate, was a
South Korean attempt to influence government officials and media representatives in
favor of South Korean policy priorities. Two simultaneous investigations resulted: one
by the House Committee on Standards and Official Conduct and one by the Justice
Department.77 The investigation initially indicted three individuals. Charges included
7^ Walsh, "President Defends His Korea Policy: Push to Develop Nuclear Weapons Hinted In Seoul,"A-l.
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using millions of dollars in an attempt to influence officials. Richard T. Hanna, was a
former Congressman, Kim Han-Cho, was a Korean-American, and Park Tong-sun, was a
Korean citizen and the main figure in the affair.78 Park returned to Korea and South
Korean officials did not allow him to be extradited nor for him to be questioned by U.S.
investigators. Sungjoo Han points out the details of these strained relations:
South Korea's reluctance to comply with the requests of the U.S.
investigators produced a serious strain in relations between the two
countries. In mid October, U.S. Justice Department officials, headed by
Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, failed to reach an
agreement with the ROK officials on the question of Park Tong-sun'
s
return despite four days of negotiation in Seoul. Immediately afterwards,
the House Committee on International Relations refused even to consider
President Carter's request to authorize the transfer of $800 million worth
of weapons to South Korea until South Korea was less adamant about Park
Tong-sun' s return.79
During the investigations, the South Korean reluctance to provide witnesses was
undermined by several high level defectors who testified before the investigating House
committee. Among these was the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
(KCIA) from 1963 to 1969, Kim Hyung-Wook. 80 An unexpected bonus of these
defections was detailed information on the nuclear weapons program that had been
underway in the mid 1970s. This information included plans to acquire not only
78 Han. "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance,"48.
79 Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance, "49.
80 Han, "South Korea 1977: Preparing for Self-Reliance,"49.
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fissionable material, but also reprocessing facilities, and other components required for
assembling a weapon. 81
D. THE ROK NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND U.S. REACTIONS
A declassified document that chronicles a conversation between President John F.
Kennedy and President Park Chung-Hee in 1961 gives a hint at early ROK interest in a
nuclear program: "Kennedy asked Pak if Korea has considered atomic power generation.
Pak replies no, that at this point, it is too expensive a proposal, but, smiling, says it would
be possible with financial help from the U.S."82 Was the only barrier for Seoul at that
time financial? Both Japan and North Korea had already embarked on programs of their
own. Certainly, a nuclear power program, although too expensive at that point, must
have been considered by the ROK leadership. In 1961, South Korea was at the beginning
of a period of great economic growth. A nuclear power program may have been too
much of an economic burden at that time, but it would soon become possible, especially
given the right motive: a drastically changing strategic environment coupled with new
American policies toward Asian allies.
Plans for the ROK nuclear weapons program began after the July 1968
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. President Park Chung-Hee had been anxious to
°1 Leonard S. Spector. Nuclear Proliferation Today. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 341.
°2 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1961, 3:30-4:50 p.m. //Source: Kennedy
Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Park Visit, 11/61-12/61. (Secret: Declassified).
Drafted by Koren and approved in S on December 5 and in the Department of Defense on December 6. The
closing time of the meeting, which was held in the White House, is from the President's Appointment Book.
(Ibid.) Extensive briefing material for Pak's visit is ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea,
Park Visit, 11/61-12/61, and ibid., Park Briefing Book, 11/14/61-11/15/61, Parts 1-111.
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exercise more independence from the United States. The tenets of the Nixon Doctrine
gave Park the justification to undertake massive modernization of the military in South
Korea. During the 1970s, South Korea adopted two five-year military modernization
programs, the Modernization of the Republic of Korea Army (1971-1976) and the Five-
Year Force Improvement Plan, which began in 1975. ROK designed these programs to
compensate for the Nixon Doctrine and the removal of the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division
from South Korea in 1971. Among the goals of these programs were the development
and acquisition of advanced conventional weapons, the expansion of Korea's
technological infrastructure, and the development of an independent nuclear capability. 83
The United States funded the adoption of the massive military modernization programs
by Seoul in an attempt to compensate for the loss of conventional U.S. forces in Korea.
Between 1971 and 1975, the United States instituted a total of $1.5 billion in aid
packages to South Korea.84 Having no nuclear reactors or significant civilian power
program yet, plans for nuclear development were embryonic in the early 1970s. For
Seoul, however, the military modernization program also included plans to compensate
for the possible loss of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.85
Although the U.S. military presence in South Korea was vital for ROK security,
America's reasons for remaining there were diminishing. To replace this capability, the
°3 Young. "Korea's Future," 1065.
°4 Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea, 101.
°5 Young. "Korea's Future," 1065.
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Modernization of the Republic of Korea Army and subsequent Five-Year Force
Improvement Plan included both the purchase of modern weapons and technology from
overseas, and the eventual development of nuclear weapons. A 12 June 1975 article in
The Washington Post reported that Park, for the first time, confirmed that South Korea
had the capability to go nuclear and that it would do so if abandoned by the United States.
He also stated that ROK was honoring the NPT.86 Later, Park confirmed this in a
statement made in an interview on 26 June 1975 with The Washington Post, saying that
South Korea, "would do anything necessary to insure its survival including development
of nuclear weapons. . .if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn."87 In fact, Young points
out that the nuclear plan was of very high priority and designed to provide a virtual
nuclear capability:
Seoul may reason that it must maintain, as a minimum, a nuclear option
such as the one enjoyed by Israel and Japan which can, with short notice,
be easily changed to a war footing that could manufacture nuclear
warheads and missiles. Seoul appears to have made a decision to 'go
nuclear' in the long run...That South Korea is a signatory power of the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty does not deter it from pursuing the policy
of preparing for the contingency of nuclear development.88
Park's announcement in 1975 regarding the nuclear program referred to ROK
acquisition of civilian technology. Part of this build up, in addition to the U.S. sponsored
reactors that went online in 1975, included the purchase of a French built nuclear fuel
°" Evans, "Korea: Park's Inflexibility," A-19.
87 Young. "Korea's Future," 1065-8.
°° Young. "Korea's Future," 1067.
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reprocessing plant. This would allow ROK to separate weapons grade plutonium from
spent fuel rods using a chemical process. Also included in planned purchases was a
Canadian Candu reactor, allowing for greater plutonium production, and similar to the
one used by India in building its atomic explosive in 1974.89 It was also asserted by both
Korean and Western diplomatic sources that ROK scientists already had the technical
expertise to build a nuclear weapon.90 After the cancellation of the purchase of the
French built reprocessing plant, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)
still had plans to build a fuel fabrication facility and experimental chemical reprocessing
plant at a cost of $4 million. The ROK government's long term goal was an annual
refining and converting capacity of 300 tons of uranium.91 In 1976, South Korea
possessed approximately one thousand atomic scientists, 600 of which worked at
KEARI.92 An article by Carson Mark documents successful tests made by Lawrence
Livermore Nuclear Laboratory in 1962 using a reactor grade plutonium warhead.93 This
indicates that a reprocessing facility is unnecessary to design and build a weapon.94
°9
"Seoul Officials Say Strong U.S. Pressure Forced Cancellation of Plans." The New York Times, 1
February 1996, A-ll.
"0
"Seoul Officials Say Strong U.S. Pressure Forced Cancellation of Plans," A-ll.
91 Young-Sun Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea," Asian Survey 18,
no. 11 (November 1978): 1134,8.
92 Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea," 1 134,8.
93 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 550.
94 W. J. Lanouette, "N-Power: Carter Holds the Key," Far Eastern Economic Review 99, no. 1 (6 January
1978):22.
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After public exposure of the program, U.S. officials and diplomats focused on
halting the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea. Declassified memoranda
show that this involved the possibility of withholding financial aid packages and civilian
nuclear technology vital to Seoul's nuclear power program.95 The United States also
pressured France at the highest levels to cancel its deal with ROK.96 Seoul talked no
more of nuclear weapons development and received its military and nuclear technology
aid packages on schedule.
Later reports reveal, however, that the program continued. As late as 1978 Park
said that a Korean nuclear weapons program was ninety-five percent complete.97 The
same year, an article in Far Eastern Economic Review referred to South Korea and
Pakistan as being within four to six years of the technical capability of detonating a
nuclear weapon.98
95 Cable on ROK nuclear fuel reprocessing plan, (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 30 June 1975)
Document: 0308, Declassified 6 September 1994. Talking points in this cable suggest that it be noted to
ROK officials that the issue of an export-import bank loan for the ROK is before Congress, and that it may
very well be disapproved unless concerns regarding reprocessing and storage of fissile materials from spent
fuels are satisfied. Difficulties are anticipated with the loan unless ROK terminates its plans to acquire a
pilot reprocessing plant. Also, Memorandum from Jan M. Lodal and Dave Elliott, to Secretary Kissinger.
(Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 24 July 1975) Declassified 13 June 1995. Discussed
withholding U.S. peaceful nuclear assistance unless French deal is halted.
9° Memorandum from John A. Froebe, Jr., to Secretary Kissinger. (Washington D.C.: National Security
Council, 1 1 July 1975) Document: 0428, Declassified 1 June 1995. Suggestion that U.S. should halt sale of
reprocessing equipment through pressure on the French at high levels.
9'
"S. Korea Said To Have Almost Had A-Bomb In Late '70's," (Seoul: Kyodo News International, Inc, 5
October 1995) Available online through Lexis Nexis.
98 Lanouette, "N-Power: Carter Holds the Key,"22.
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E. CONCLUSION
Seoul viewed Vietnam as proof of the decreasing strategic significance of Asian
allies to the United States. The official U.S. policy during this period, the Nixon
Doctrine, called for greater ROK self-reliance, particularly concerning national security
and defense. Yet, given the role of U.S. forces in the past, which included a nuclear facet
of both extended deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula, this
required ROK to develop nuclear weapons of their own. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is
important in both deterring North Korea from attack and in preventing a ROK nuclear
weapons program. However, it is only credible in conjunction with a U.S. troop
presence.
Carter's plan to withdraw American troops from the peninsula was not only
destabilizing for Seoul, but as the debate on the issue ensued, it suggested Korea's
decreasing priority in U.S. foreign policy. The planned withdrawal of American forces
from Korea would prompt South Korea to develop a nuclear arsenal, according to
statements made by President Park." Many at the time argued for a Korean peninsula
nuclear free zone. South Korea, with its investment in nuclear technology and an ongoing
weapons program would have strongly resisted this idea unless the United States were
willing to sign a treaty assuring that aggression in Korea by the Soviet Union or Peoples'
Republic of China (PRC) would be countered by the United States. Given the goals of
99 Evans, "Korea: Park's Inflexibility," A-19.
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the Nixon Doctrine and the withdrawal itself, this was unlikely. 100 George F. Will writes
of changed Asian perceptions shortly after the fall of Saigon: "Many nations have based
their security plans on the assumption that the United States has the will to make its
power an actuality. Now these nations may conclude that it is prudent to assume the
worst about the willingness of the United States to make its power felt." 101 This situation
is what led ROK to come so close to developing nuclear weapons.
100 Young "Korea's Future: Seoul's Perspective," 1070.
101 George F. Will, "When Power is Not Power," The Washington Post, 3 May 1975, A-19.
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IV. NORDPOLITIK AND THE NUCLEAR CRISIS
A. NORDPOLITIK AND THE FALL OF COMMUNISM
Seoul's policy of Nordpolitik in the 1980s and the subsequent fall of the majority
of the communist world had a significant impact on ROK views on national defense the
security role of the United States. It had a similarly negative impact on Pyongyang,
isolating North Korea from its only remaining allies. Nordpolitik, or Seoul's plan to
normalize relations with the communist world, originated with ROK Foreign Minister,
Lee Bum Suk in 1983. He called the policy, Nordpolitik, or "northern politics," after the
West German Ostpolitik. 102 Before the PRC had implemented the economic reforms that
would come in the late 1980s and before the era of new thinking in the former Soviet
Union, South Korea sought diplomatic and economic relations with communist states.
Nordpolitik was to open economic ties with the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of
China, and other communist nations. Nordpolitik provided Seoul with an avenue leading
to a more prominent international image in the realms of politics and trade.
South Korea also sought to prevent its new relations with China and the Soviet
Union from alarming the government in Pyongyang. Previously, ROK policies had
aimed at the alienation and isolation of the DPRK from as many countries as possible. 103
Nordpolitik was a policy designed to bring Pyongyang out of isolation and into the
102 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 187.
103 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 187.
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international community. Seoul hoped that bringing North Korea into an open forum
would allow for better negotiations between the two Koreas.
Nordpolitik ushered in a new diplomatic era for ROK. While its relations with the
United States previously dominated Seoul's decisions, Nordpolitik acknowledged the
new position ROK played within the Asian strategic balance even before the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Seoul's client status was obsolete. The
independence that ROK leadership desired could become a reality. The communist world
was changing and the role that the United States played within the now very economically
capable South Korea also was different. Seoul's courtship of the communist world not
only indicated a relative decrease in importance of the U.S. role on the peninsula, but also
displayed South Korea's decreasing concern for communist world support for North
Korea. In the post-Cold War environment, Washington's ability to influence Seoul
decreased. No longer did the United States wield the power it had in the 1970s when
ROK had last attempted to develop nuclear weapons.
Seoul designed Nordpolitik to warm relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union
while simultaneously minimizing any threat that Pyongyang would perceive. In fact, it
only emphasized Seoul's diplomatic and economic advantage over Pyongyang. South
Korea was gaining international status through a burgeoning economy and through events
such as hosting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. The timing of
Nordpolitik could not have been better. In the PRC, Deng Xiao Ping was encouraging
market oriented reforms and opening trade. Gorbachev's "new thinking" campaign was
changing the economic outlook in the Soviet Union. Seoul established formal diplomatic
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ties with the Russian Republic in 1990 and with the PRC in 1992. Paul H. B. Godwin
summarizes the gravity of South Korean relations with the PRC:
China's own position on the peninsula was most clearly stated by the
expansion of its trade and commercial relationship with the ROK, and the
1992 establishment of full diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul.
The ROK's contribution to China's economic development goals is seen
as far more important than the ideological ties binding Pyongyang and
Beijing, even at a time when the Chinese leadership sees all socialist states
as under siege from the corrosive Western strategy of 'peaceful
evolution'."104
Edward Olsen reaches a similar conclusion about Gorbachev's meetings with ROK
President Roh Tae-Woo in Moscow, Cheju Do and San Francisco and the establishment
of diplomatic ties in 1992: "Those developments and the promise of continued
improvements in ROK-Russian ties almost certainly has sealed North Korea's diplomatic
fate." 105 Seoul was expanding its diplomatic relations to the allies of North Korea while
Pyongyang had made little progress with Japan or the United States, South Korea's main
allies. Time has reinforced this victory. In 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a
state visit to South Korea and was the first head of state from the PRC to set foot in ROK.
In contrast, no Chinese head of state has ever visited North Korea. 106 Nordpolitik may
have made provision for assuring the DPRK of Seoul's good intentions, but its success
only further isolated Pyongyang.
104 Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment,'
in East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Sheldon W. Simon (Armonk, New York: M. E.
Sharpe, Inc, 1993), 132.
10
-> Edward A. Olsen, "The Diplomatic Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation," in East Asian Security
in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Sheldon W. Simon (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1993), 106.
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South Korea's new policy toward the communist world and the end of the Cold
War caused several changes. Realization of a changing strategic environment in the
1980s and a desire to capitalize on that change led Seoul to its Nordpolitik policy. The
U.S. position in Asia and in the affairs on the Korean peninsula decreased in terms of the
influence it wielded despite statements to the contrary. Although the United States still
held the title as the cornerstone of security on the Korean peninsula, some South Koreans
no longer thought of it that way. As ROK achieved more independence, some believed
that statements highlighting America's continuing dominant role in Korean security were
merely attempts to limit the divergence in U.S. and ROK interests. 107 In the past, these
problems had been resolved by the U.S. dominance in U.S.-ROK relations. That same
level of influence no longer existed.
In addition, South Korea's courtship of the PRC and the Soviet Union caused
great anxiety in North Korea, in spite of measures taken to prevent such a reaction. Kim
Il-Sung's rejection of ROK messages that were relayed via Gorbachev makes it clear that
this tactic by Seoul was suspect in the North. The great success of Seoul's program of
normalization with China and Russia turned North Korea's diplomatic world upside-
down. South Korea gained a great deal in opening these relations. Economically it was a
benefit, and brought Seoul new international status. Nordpolitik, the Olympic Games and
the fall of the communist world all contributed to Seoul's gaining a foothold with new
allies and economic partners while these same countries began to pull away from North
10' Olsen, "The Diplomatic Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation," 1 10.
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Korea. An excerpt from a Beijing newspaper celebrating the fifth anniversary of PRC-
ROK relations emphasizes the ROK role on the peninsula vice that of North Korea: "The
Chinese people and the ROK people have had a history of friendly exchanges for over
2,000 years. Due to historical reasons, such exchanges had once been suspended for
nearly half a century." 108 While economically beneficial to ROK, Seoul's new relations
might have prompted Pyongyang to begin its nuclear weapons program in an attempt to
compensate for the perceived loss of Chinese and Russian support. Not only had North
Korea lost support from these allies, but ROK had gained that very same help.
Revolutionary world trends had combined with innovative ROK foreign policy successes
to erode North Korea's international position since 1985. 109 It was during this very same
period that Pyongyang stepped up its bid to become a nuclear power.
B. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
Since 1987, both military analysts and politicians have feared the possibility of a
nuclear-armed North Korea. 110 North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 at the behest of the
Soviet Union. 111 Pyongyang's interest in nuclear capability spans back to the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to U.S. atomic diplomacy during the Korean
108 FBIS-CHI-97-251, 25 August 97.
'"" Olsen, "The Diplomatic Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation," 111.
HO Matthias Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation
Regime," The Nonproliferation Review 2, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 31.
111 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 285.
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War. 112 Beginning in 1956, North Korean scientists received training in the Soviet
Union. In addition, in 1959, the Soviet Union transferred a small research reactor and
other equipment to North Korea. In 1965, a decade after the initial receipt of help from
the U.S.S.R., North Korea received another larger research reactor from the Soviet Union.
This unit became operational in 1967 near the site that later became known as the
Yongbyon facility. 113 The same year, North Korea discovered large deposits of
uranium. 114
During the 1970s, the North Korean nuclear infrastructure grew to include
enrichment technology and weapons design. Among these facilities were a uranium mill
and a purification plant designed to concentrate ore into "yellowcake," and a fuel rod
fabrication facility. 115 In 1980, North Korea began construction of a 30-megawatt
(thermal) graphite-moderated reactor running on natural uranium. 116 This reactor,
located at Yongbyon, began operating in 1986 and was a Calder Hall type reactor,
designed to burn natural uranium at a low rate, producing a high proportion of plutonium-
1 *2 Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,"
32.
113 Alexandre Y. Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear
Program," The Nonproliferation Review 2, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1995): 26.
1 14 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 25.
1 15 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 26;
also, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 607. Through the
process of milling, uranium ore, containing only a small percentage of uranium oxide (U3O8) is converted
into material containing a high percentage (80 percent) of U3 8 . This is often referred to as "yellowcake".
11" Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,"
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239 in its spent fuel rods compared to a light-water power reactor. This facility was ideal
for producing material for a weapons program. 1 17 The absence of power lines connecting
the facility to a power grid made the project even more suspicious. 1 18
Alexandre Y. Monsourov traces Kim U-Sung's nuclear ambitions and the rapid
expansion of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program in the late 1970s to four major
events since 1945: the use of the bomb on Japan to force a quick surrender, the
consideration by the United States to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War, the
Cuban missile crisis and the ROK nuclear weapons program that was pursued in the
1970s. 119 Japan's surrender following two nuclear strikes made a huge impression on
Kim after the fierce and largely unsuccessful fighting he had participated in against the
Japanese. 120 Learning later, that the United States had seriously contemplated using
nuclear weapons in Korea forced Kim to confront the requirement for assistance against
such a capability. This realization resulted in North Korea signing the Alliance Treaties
on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with both the Soviet Union and the
117 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 234.
1 1° Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 28.
1 19 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 28-9.
120 xhis author concedes that there are alternate explanations regarding the Japanese surrender. See Robert
A. Pape, "Why Japan Surrendered," International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 154-201. These
arguments are compelling and may in fact be correct. For the purposes of this thesis, however, what is
important is the perception, by Kim Il-Sung, and others, that the atomic bomb ended the war. This view is
argued by Barton J. Bernstein, "Correspondence: Letter to the Editor," International Security 16, no. 3
(Winter 1991/2): 204-21.
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PRC in 1961, bringing the DPRK under these respective nuclear umbrellas. 121 Kim
viewed the Cuban missile crisis as a Soviet sellout of a close ally, leading him to question
the reliability of the Soviet nuclear umbrella promised to North Korea. An indigenous
capability would give North Korea greater autonomy over strategic defense. Kim
authorized a review of North Korea's nuclear policies, but still refrained from developing
nuclear weapons. 122 Evidence of Seoul's nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, the
introduction of the TEAM SPIRIT exercises and evidence of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons on the peninsula prompted Kim to launch a nuclear weapons program in the late
1970s. 123
In September of 1974, North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). In 1977, North Korea signed an agreement with the IAEA that required
the monitoring of its two small research reactors. 124 As North Korea's nuclear program
progressed, the international community became concerned that Pyongyang might use
this growing nuclear capability as a stepping stone to nuclear weapons development. The
Soviet Union convinced North Korea to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in
December of 1985. It was not until April of 1992, however, that the North Korean
*21 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 28.
Although the PRC did not have a nuclear capability in 1961, the above agreement brought the DPRK under
the future Chinese umbrella, which was developed later that decade.
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government finally ratified the nuclear safeguards agreement. 125 This occurred after the
United States declared the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean
peninsula. 126 In addition, ROK President Roh Tae-Woo stated that South Korea would
not seek to produce nuclear weapons. 127 In 1992, both North and South Korea signed a
Joint Denuclearization Declaration agreeing to make the peninsula free of nuclear
weapons and to forego development of a reprocessing and enrichment capability. 128
Traditionally, the IAEA safeguards had been limited to the inspection of declared
facilities, making it possible to circumvent them by reprocessing material at undisclosed
sites. 129 It was this possibility in North Korea that produced the IAEA request for special
inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. The DPRK had started
construction of a facility that would allow scientists to extract plutonium from spent
125 Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,"
33.
126 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 238.
127 Sam Jameson, "No A-Arms For South Korea, Leader Pledges," The New York Times, 14 November
1993, A-8.
128 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 286.
129 Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,"
32.
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nuclear fuel via a chemical process known as PUREX. 130 In May of 1992, the IAEA
performed its first inspections on the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. 131
During the initial series of inspections, the IAEA officials found evidence of
North Korea's noncompliance with its NPT obligations. This occurred in each of the first
six inspections, leading the inspectors to recommend special inspections, which would
allow for access to undeclared facilities. In reaction to the request for special inspections,
Pyongyang decided to withdraw from the NPT regime in March of 1993. 132 The United
States pursued negotiations with North Korea to clear up the matter quickly. Meetings
between the United States and the DPRK, which took place in Geneva in June of 1993,
reinforced Seoul's feelings of isolation and fear that U.S.-DPRK relations were
progressing without ROK participation. 133 In exchange for resumption of IAEA
inspections, Pyongyang demanded economic and technical assistance for its nuclear
power program and diplomatic recognition from the United States. During the first two
rounds of talks, the United States went from demanding a total freeze of North Korea's
nuclear program to offering limited rewards in exchange for regaining permission for the
I-3" Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 605. PUREX is the
abbreviation for Plutonium U{R}ranium E{X}traction. A solvent extraction process commonly used in fuel
processing that individually separates the uranium from the accompanying fission products contained in
irradiated fuel.
'31 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 27.
132 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 27.
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IAEA to conduct safeguard inspections of North Korean facilities. 134 U.S. experts
estimated that the reactor had been shut down in 1989 and that the entire core had been
replaced, providing North Korean scientists with enough spent nuclear fuel to produce
two bombs. 135 Pyongyang admitted to extracting a small amount of plutonium from
these rods for research purposes. U.S. intelligence organizations believed this was
enough fissionable material to construct at least one bomb, although some estimates
stated as many as five. 136
After pursing a flexible approach to the North Korean problem, the United States
eventually convinced Pyongyang to allow IAEA inspections to resume. On 1 March
1994, these inspections began. The officials immediately discovered that a seal on the
reprocessing plant had been broken and the inspectors could not tour locations that had
been previously included as inspection sites. This meant that the IAEA could no longer
determine if North Korean scientists had diverted fuel to a secret weapons program.
North Korean scientists had discharged the reactor, making it impossible to reconstruct
the history of the fuel cycle. 137 A new phase in the crisis was beginning, with
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Washington attempting to reach an agreement by providing carrots. South Korean
officials requested that the United States not resume high-level talks with North Korea
unless Pyongyang agreed to full nuclear inspections. 138 During talks in Pyongyang on 19
March 1994, a North Korean negotiator made threatening remarks about turning Seoul
into a fireball. In April, the North Korean Army Chief of Staff, Choe Gwang, accused the
United States, Japan, and South Korea of provoking the North and said that his army
would annihilate them. The United States and ROK heightened the defense posture in
response to these remarks and planned to deploy Patriot anti-aircraft missiles to South
Korea. 139 Washington began forming a coalition of states to impose sanctions against the
DPRK, while ROK insisted on firm but gradual actions. In the face of impending
sanctions, North Korea declared its immediate withdrawal from the IAEA on 13 June
1994.140
To defuse the impasse over the nuclear negotiations that occurred in the spring of
1994, former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim D-Sung.
Although Carter stopped in Seoul, visiting the U.S. ambassador James Laney, General
Gary Luck, Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea and President Kim Young-Sam, before
moving on to North Korea, his visit to Pyongyang made many in the South anxious.
South Koreans feared that the cunning Kim D-Sung would manipulate Carter into making
13° Cameron W. Barr, "S. Koreans Uneasy Over U.S. Tack On North's Intransigence," Christian Science
Monitor, 31 May 1994. Available online at [http://plweb.csmonitor.com].
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concessions. 141 Indeed, Carter made promises and statements that were contrary to the
desires of the Clinton administration while conducting talks to resolve the crisis.
Although delayed until the autumn of 1994 due to the death of Kim fl-Sung, Carter's
negotiations led to the continuation of talks and ultimately to the Agreed Framework.
The United States and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework on 21 October
1994. Although the United States consulted with the ROK government during
negotiations for the deal, there remains a negative feeling in South Korea regarding the
Agreed Framework. Many in the United States also regard it as a weak agreement. 142
The Agreed Framework resulted in the DPRK freezing its nuclear program and
reaffirming its membership in the NPT. Included in the freeze was the halt of the
construction of planned 50 megawatt (thermal) and 200 megawatt (thermal) reactors and
the securing of the chemical reprocessing facility. 143 What North Korea gained from this
deal is just as important. Economically, it gained the equivalent of $4.5 billion, including
the construction of two light-water reactors, the transfer of advanced western technology,
the pledge of a ten year supply of oil until the new reactors are operational and the easing
14^ Dembinski, "North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,'
36.
141 Young, "Confrontation or Compromise? Lessons from the 1994 Crisis,"194.
142 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 25.
14
^ State Department, "Fact sheet on U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework,"
(Washington D. C.:Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996). Available online at
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of the economic embargo. 144 A consortium consisting of the United States, Japan and
South Korea, called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development program (KEDO) will
oversee the construction of the two light-water reactors in North Korea. ROK will design
and build the reactors and shoulder most of the cost, with some help from Japan. 145
Politically, North Korea was able to open diplomatic ties with the United States
and other countries, break out of its self-imposed isolation, and join several international
organizations. 146 This allowed the North to catch up to ROK in terms of political and
diplomatic status, a battle it had been losing since South Korea had implemented
Nordpolitik. The Agreed Framework also refers to a commitment on the part of the
United States and the DPRK to establish full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial
level. 147 The United States has provided a negative security assurance to the DPRK: a
pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea as long as it remains a member in
good standing of the NPT regime. 148 Although not specifically addressed in the
agreement, the crisis led to the indefinite cancellation of the TEAM SPIRIT military
exercise. 149 These conciliatory actions, however, did not establish a requirement for
144 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 33.
14^ State Department, "Fact sheet on U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework."
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special inspections to discern if a North Korean nuclear weapon exists at a secret
facility. 150
Although the Agreed Framework is still in place, problems continue at every
meeting. Talks in 1995 collapsed on 20 April due to North Korea's reluctance to accept a
plan to replace its nuclear reactors with safer, light-water units built and mainly financed
by South Korea. North Korea's acceptance would be an admission of ROK superior
expertise and would represent a major loss of face for Pyongyang. Pyongyang further
stated that it would consider economic sanctions an act of war. 151 In June 1995, at the
talks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, North Korea continued to haggle over the South
Korean-built light-water reactors and over monetary compensation for abandoning its old
reactors. U.S. and ROK officials at the meetings talked of North Korea's frustrating
tactics of reopening issues, suddenly introducing new conditions, and insisting on
renegotiating done deals. 152
The 18 September 1997 incursion of a North Korean spy submarine also called
into question Pyongyang's intentions. The construction of the light-water reactors ceased
until South Korea received an apology from Pyongyang. 153 Hwang Jang Yop, who
15 Cameron W. Barr, "North Korea Jerks the U.S., South Korea in Nuke Talks," Christian Science
Monitor, 5 June 1995. Available online at [http://plweb.csmonitor.com].
151 Jonathan S. Landay, "North Korea Talks Tough But U.S. Sees Hope on Nukes," Christian Science
Monitor, 1 May 1995. Available online at [http://plweb.csmonitor.com].
152 Barr, "North Korea Jerks the U.S., South Korea in Nuke Talks".
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defected in 1997, emphasized North Korea's preparations for war and determination to
invade the South. The highest level North Korean defector to date, Hwang's comments
further called into question the true intentions of North Korea's negotiating tactics. The
immediate effect of the economic crisis on South Korea makes it difficult for Seoul to
continue the North Korean reactor construction on the same schedule and complicates an
already difficult situation. Only weeks after the ground breaking for the reactors
construction in North Korea, ROK was hit with a financial crisis that caused the Korean
won to lose 42 percent of its value against the dollar. 154 Some officials in South Korea
continue to believe that in the Agreed Framework and following talks, the United States
gave away too much, too easily. They want the United States to pay more of the bill. 155
The recent delays on reactor construction have resulted in new fears that North Korea will
abandon the Agreed Framework. During a May trip to Asia, U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright warned the other members of KEDO that North Korea may resume
its nuclear weapons program if previous pledges are not met. 156 On 7 May, a North
Korean spokesman warned the United States that if the delays continued, North Korea
may resume its nuclear development program. Specifically, he said that the work on
sealing spent nuclear fuel rods containing plutonium would no longer proceed, and that
154 Carol Giacomo, "Albright Warns S. Korea On North's Nuclear Plan," Reuters, 1 May 1997. Available
online at [http://dailynews.yahoo.com].
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the freeze on construction of facilities would be lifted unless the United States acts. 157
These statements are tantamount to threatening to restart the weapons program.
C. CONCLUSION
South Korea's pursuit of Nordpolitik produced two outcomes. First, it established
further ROK economic and diplomatic independence from the United States. Second, it
threatened Pyongyang's longstanding relationship with both the PRC and the Soviet
Union, casting doubt on future cooperation and security assurances. Nordpolitik helped
send North Korea down the path of nuclear weapons development, ultimately leading to
the 1994 nuclear crisis.
The North Korean nuclear crisis has yielded significant positive results for the
regime in Pyongyang in economic, military and diplomatic terms. Seoul views
Washington as having given away the farm just to keep Pyongyang from pulling out of
the NPT and to ensure that North Korea will comply with the required inspections by the
IAEA. The United States did away with the TEAM SPIRIT field exercise, made negative
security guarantees with Pyongyang, removed all tactical nuclear weapons from the
Korean peninsula and from U.S. naval surface vessels, guaranteed light-water reactors to
replace the graphite ones previously operated in North Korea, warmed diplomatic ties
with the DPRK and pushed forward an agreement by which ROK gives up its right,
according to the NPT, to reprocess nuclear fuel. Seoul believes these events erode the
traditional American security guarantee to South Korea. Monsourov refers to
157 FBIS-EAS-98-127, 7 May 1998.
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conversations with high-ranking ROK officials in which the U.S.-DPRK negotiations are
compared to a "wedding where the groom (ROK) and the bride (DPRK) were supposed
to get married, but, instead, the minister (United States) fell in love with the bride,
hijacked her, and fled the ceremony." 158
158 Monsourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," 37.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. STATUS OF ROK NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
The Republic of Korea has officially stated that it will not develop nuclear
weapons. In 1993 President Kim Young Sam declared that under no circumstances
would South Korea attempt to develop nuclear weapons. 159 ROK signed the NPT in
1975 and in 1991 signed a document with North Korea pledging to eliminate nuclear
weapons from the Korean peninsula. This agreement also restricts ROK from running
reprocessing and enrichment facilities that it would otherwise have the right to operate
under the NPT.
South Korea has not developed technology exclusive to the development of
nuclear weapons. It does, however, possess a well-developed civilian nuclear power and
research program that includes many dual use elements. South Korea now operates 9
reactors, which provide 43 percent of its total electricity. In 1994, the ROK government
spent $1.5 billion for nuclear research. 160 By 2006, South Korea plans to have 27
reactors in operation. 161 Seoul also desires to become a leading exporter of nuclear
power. It has signed deals with both China and Vietnam to build reactors. 162
l5" Jameson, "No A-Arms For South Korea, Leader Pledges," A-8.
*"" Suvendrini Kakuchi, "Korean Nuclear Deal Would Add Fuel to Seoul's Ambitions," Inter Press
Service, 31 October 1995. Available on Lexis Nexis.
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ROK operates hot cells, supplied by France, to diagnose fuel problems and
improve fuel quality. It is possible to use these facilities to separate plutonium, although
the process would be tedious. 163 There are concerns in the United States that if ROK
enlarges this facility, it could indicate an intention to use it as a reprocessing operation.
Seoul has expressed strong interest in acquiring reprocessing technologies, in spite of
U.S. opposition, arguing that it is essential for the export of civilian nuclear
technology. 164 Although a reprocessing capability is within the constraints of the NPT, it
violates the agreement ROK signed with Pyongyang in 1991. It would also take ROK
one step closer to a virtual nuclear weapon capability. In addition, a new research reactor
became operational at Daeduk, in 1995. Its heavy water moderated design would make it
capable of producing higher amounts of plutonium, although it currently uses 19.75
percent enriched fuel, which will not produce significant amounts of plutonium. 165
Officially, ROK reactors have produced 8.4 tons of plutonium and Seoul has not
reprocessed any of this material. 166
Reports of persisting ROK interest in nuclear weapons periodically surface. Suh
Sujong, former chief secretary to the head of the Agency for National Security stated that
in 1991, ROK planned to develop nuclear weapons in response to the North Korean
163 David Albright, Frans Berkout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996:
World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 365.
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program, but that the United States stopped the project. 167 A sizable minority of South
Koreans believes that ROK should pursue a reprocessing capability, although a much
smaller number advocate developing nuclear weapons. 168 ROK has uranium refining and
conversion facilities and a fuel fabrication capability, but lacks reprocessing plants, unless
it were to use the hot cells previously mentioned. 169
If ROK decided to develop nuclear weapons, it possesses the physical
infrastructure and the technological expertise to do so. It would have to withdraw from
the NPT, which would be politically damaging, especially given its close relationship
with the United States. Nevertheless, given a sufficient threat, it could do so, and could
use its well-developed research facilities and civilian nuclear power program to produce
and separate plutonium. 170
B. ECONOMIC FAILURE
The 1997 economic crisis hit South Korea hard. Currently, the country is
revamping its economic and domestic policies, as required by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) bailout. This massive crisis, however, does not mean that a nuclear weapons
*"" Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 563.
1"' Albright, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and
Policies, 365.
'"° Andrew Mack, "Potential, not Proliferation," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53 no. 4 (Jul/Aug
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program is beyond Seoul's grasp. A country in dire economic straits is bound to alter its
defense plan. A strong defense and even a nuclear weapons program, however, are still
within reach.
Three factors limit the effect of the economic crisis on South Korea's ability to
develop nuclear weapons. The first is that some economists believe that the Asian tigers
may end up stronger following the reforms required by the IMF. 171 With broad reaching
revision and massive foreign investment, Korea could emerge from this crisis more
capable of competing on the international market. There are also those who believe the
crisis, while real and serious, will blow over quickly given the robust measures that are
being taken by ROK and the IMF, and given the continued ability of ROK to produce
goods.
The second argument is the Soviet example. During the Cold War, defense was
so important that Moscow maintained a military infrastructure at all costs. The Soviet
Union continued to build huge amounts of sophisticated conventional and nuclear
weapons during the 1980s, even as their very state and economy crumbled around them.
This example suggests that ROK could still choose to pursue a nuclear weapons program,
in spite of economic hardship, if security ranked high enough as a national priority.
Finally, if extremely credible deterrence is the primary goal, nuclear weapons
accomplish this goal much more cost effectively than sophisticated conventional
weapons. Therefore, during an economic crisis, nuclear weapons would appear even
1
'
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more attractive than developing advanced conventional weapons that are more expensive.
Albert Wohlstetter argues that the cost of developing nuclear weapons for a state that
already possesses a well-developed civilian nuclear power program is small in
comparison with a program designed exclusively to build weapons. 172
C. ANSWER TO THE THESIS QUESTION
During the 1950s, the Korean government saw the utility of nuclear weapons,
both in the atomic diplomacy conducted by the United States during the Korean War and
in the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. The Korean War
and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty established ROK reliance on the United States.
The weak nature of the Mutual Defense Treaty put doubt about America's commitment to
the defense of the peninsula in the minds of many South Koreans. The U.S. military
presence and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons compensated for this weakness.
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, doubts regarding U.S. commitment in Asia
resurfaced. America's performance in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine, and U.S. troop
withdrawals from ROK spurred Seoul to pursue self-reliance in national defense
capability. Although the Nixon Doctrine preserved U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for
ROK, this commitment was ultimately based on the Mutual Defense Treaty, a weak
foundation for confidence in strategic defense. The U.S. troop presence, which was
always an indicator of U.S. commitment to South Korea, was also decreasing.
172 Albert Wohlstetter, "Spreading the Bomb without Breaking the Rules," Foreign Policy 25 (Winter
76/7): 163.
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These factors combined to convince Seoul that U.S. extended deterrence was
questionable, an unacceptable situation for ROK, whose national defense had relied on
nuclear weapons since the early 1950s. Seoul resolved to develop its own capability.
Diplomatic reaffirmation of U.S. commitment and presence of nuclear weapons in Korea,
threats to cut off financial and technical aid to Seoul and most importantly, the
cancellation of further troop withdrawals convinced ROK to halt its program. The basis
for the U.S.-ROK relationship, the Mutual Defense Treaty, however, is still the weak link
in terms of ROK confidence.
Is the United States forcing ROK to go nuclear in the name of nonproliferation?
The preceding case study gives a mixed answer. It depicts Washington as a vital ally of
South Korea, and one that has provided extended nuclear deterrence, yet one with a poor
record for consistent, confidence inspiring policy. U.S. actions regarding North Korea are
another link in a long chain of loss in credibility. As Waltz points out, internal balancing
is a much surer path to national security than relying on an ally. 173 Although the United
States has come through many times, the Korean War being the most significant incident,
it has also waffled in ways that are very serious threats to ROK national security. Troop
withdrawals, the Nixon Doctrine, the Vietnam record, and the aborted Carter Plan all
suggest that the United States is an unreliable ally to ROK.
The possibility of a North Korean nuclear weapon has overshadowed its
conventional threat during the 1990s. Although flooding, famine and harsh weather have
* '3 Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, 168.
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taken their toll on the regime in Pyongyang over a number of years and certainly have
reduced the readiness of the conventional forces in the north, the specter of an aggressive,
nuclear capable DPRK remains a major concern to Seoul. 174 This situation could result
in a nuclear chain event, leading to ROK and Japan arming themselves with nuclear
weapons. South Korea possesses a robust civilian nuclear power program and research
capabilities in the atomic energy field. It also possesses advanced conventional weapon
capabilities that could provide delivery vehicles via ballistic missile or third and fourth
generation aircraft.
Exclusive negotiations between the United States and North Korea are viewed by
South Korea as endangering U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, particularly
meetings that yield concessions such as the cancellation of the military exercises and a
negative security guarantee for Pyongyang. Seoul views the warming diplomatic
relations between the United States and North Korea as an unacceptable compromise in
national security. Young Whan Kihl points out that, "Carter's visit also indicated to the
DPRK that Seoul's views would hereafter play a lesser role in American decisions." 175
If the U.S. guarantee of extended deterrence is no longer credible, the South
Korean government may be compelled to develop such a capability itself, as President
Park Chung-Hee promised to do in the 1970s when Korean confidence in the U.S.
commitment to their defense ebbed. In 1993, Kim Young Sam stated that South Korea
174 Landay, "North Korea Talks Tough But U.S. Sees Hope on Nukes."
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would refrain from developing nuclear weapons. However, he specifically caveated this
statement with South Korea's right to pursue a nuclear option if threatened by a North
Korean nuclear capability. 176 The Agreed Framework assured North Korea that the
United States would not use nuclear weapons against it as long as it continues to comply
with the NPT in good faith. This negative security assurance to North Korea undermines
the positive one the U.S. has had with South Korea since the Korean War. Virginia Foran
discusses this type of dilemma and the problem it presents to traditional security
arrangements. 177 In our zeal to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, we may
undermine an existing security guarantee with the South Koreans.
Young Whan Kihl discusses the problem of nuclear credibility related to this case.
"For nuclear diplomacy to succeed as a high-risk and high-stakes game, it must be based
on and backed up by military power and preparedness. The nuclear weapon states must
be ready to go to war, if necessary, in order to defend their national interests and strategic
position. The threat of retaliatory strikes must be credible." 178 Does this threat remain
credible with the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula and in the
face of the negative and positive security assurance dilemma discussed by Foran? The
concept of deterrence seems to be strengthened by North Korean nuclear capability, that
is, it would make the U.S. tendency to back up South Korean security stronger if it were
1 '" Young. "Confrontation or Compromise," 194.
177 Foran, Virginia, ed. Security Assurances: Implicationsfor the NPT and Beyond, Draft.
17 ° Young. "Confrontation or Compromise," 202.
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deterring a real nuclear threat. Yet, negotiations did not go in this direction and the
Agreed Framework does not support this conclusion. In fact, U.S. actions during the
crisis gave credence to a lack of American commitment. As Reiss asserts: "The Clinton
administration calculated correctly that the American people would not go to war over the
integrity of the IAEA or even over one or two nuclear weapons in North Korea." 179
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. New Mutual Defense Treaty
The Mutual Defense Treaty is not an agreement that the U.S. troop presence
strengthens. Even when the U.S. conventional commitment has been strong, the
weakness of the Mutual Defense Treaty remains a tottering base on which to build
confidence. A stronger treaty with the ROK government is an important step in
preventing ROK from considering a nuclear option. For very little effort diplomatically,
the United States can create a highly stable security environment in South Korea.
Today, the United States has less influence over a more economically developed
and more diplomatically connected ROK. Yet, Washington is still able to effect
negatively the strategic balance on the peninsula by reducing its relationship with South
Korea. Promises to North Korea designed to halt its nuclear weapons program have had
this effect. Rather than continue an ambiguous security relationship with Seoul,
Washington must seek a stronger commitment with a new, more independent ROK. A
179 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 282.
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treaty more in line with a NATO commitment would give ROK both the independence it
seeks as a developing state and the ironclad commitment it desires for national security
contingencies.
2. Continued U.S. Presence
The history of the U.S.-ROK relationship is one of contradictions. Since the
Second World War, South Korea relied heavily on the United States for its national
defense and has sought to bolster its ties with the United States with a stronger treaty.
Simultaneously, it desired more independence from the U.S. alliance. From the ROK
perspective, U.S. commitment has waxed and waned, measured for the most part by U.S.
troop presence and conventional commitment. While the strategic nuclear commitment
has existed since the Korean War, ROK confidence in extended deterrence is measured
by the size of the conventional troop presence. While the Nixon Doctrine guaranteed the
U.S. strategic commitment to ROK, that same nuclear commitment lost credibility due to
the decrease in conventional commitment that was outlined by the same policy. ROK
leaders believed that if they were to fend for themselves in terms of defense, this would
include nuclear weapons. Without conventional commitment, the nuclear guarantee was
called into question.
The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula inspired a special
kind of confidence in the United States. If a nuclear guarantee is made using only
strategic weapons deployed out of the theater, it is far less credible. North Korea is more
likely to believe that the United States would respond to an attack on South Korea with a
74
tactical nuclear weapon than with an intercontinental ballistic missile or strategic bomber.
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, however, remained in Korea until the early 1990s, when
they were removed from the peninsula. It is unlikely that they will be re-deployed to the
peninsula, and the announced removal of tactical nuclear weapons from all naval surface
ships completely removes nuclear "flexible response" in the eyes of the Koreans.
Submarine launched tactical nuclear weapons are still deployed, but they are much less
"visible" a deterrent than forces deployed on the peninsula. Without tactical nuclear
weapons, the continuation of troop presence will be vital to maintaining the high level of
confidence that is required to prevent nuclear weapons development by South Korea.
3. International Enforcement of Nonproliferation Goals in North Korea
In addition, the United States should avoid becoming the spokesman for the IAEA
and the United Nations in issues of nonproliferation. In doing so in Korea, it opened the
playing field to a very creative North Korea to bring to the table virtually any unrelated
issue it wished. The United States was then forced to negotiate from a position of
weakness rather than from one of the strength of demanding that North Korea adhere to a
signed agreement.
The United States has negotiated on behalf of the international community,
allowing issues such as U.S. troop presence, ROK nuclear facilities, bilateral military
exercises and force disposition to come into play. The issue is North Korea's compliance
with an international treaty that its leaders have signed and ratified. Political demands
involving ROK and the United States must not be used as bargaining chips with which to
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alter those obligations. An international lead taken by the United Nations and the IAEA
would decrease the likelihood that North Korea could use unrelated issues to avoid or
delay compliance with the NPT. The focus should be on NPT obligations and the
required IAEA inspections.
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter has outlined specific actions that would reduce the likelihood of
ROK pursuing a nuclear weapons program. These include signing a stronger Mutual
Defense Treaty, strong assurance of a continued troop presence without significant
reductions, and letting the UN take the lead in the North Korean nuclear issue. This work
also illustrates South Korea's capability to develop a virtual nuclear capability given its
strong nuclear power program. Seoul would most likely pursue this option in a semi-
covert manner, so as not to upset the international community with an open withdrawal
from the NPT. Nuclear weapons allow for the ultimate in internal balancing. An
ambiguous nuclear threat from North Korea combined with decreasing confidence in U.S.
security assurances may lead to more defense capability in South Korea. U.S. policy
changes can overcome these negative factors. If the situation continues unchanged,
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